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Comment  Richard Portes
Having read Alberto Giovannini’s chapter, I feel I have crossed a barrier: 
I ﬁ  nally understand clearing and settlement (C&S), if not the complicated 
plumbing, at least the underlying issues. Europe has “Polish plumbers” 
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(just not enough of them), in the American election campaign we saw “Joe 
the plumber,” and securities markets everywhere have plumbing. It is very 
important.
But it is diﬃcult. Even “Joe the plumber” did not have a proper license, 
and I certainly do not. Alberto acknowledges the “technical nature of the 
subject”—he even calls it “arcane”—but he then proceeds to inﬂ  ict it on us, 
just because it is so important. The chapter gives a great description and 
analysis of C&S processes, of industry structure and its evolution.
The main message is that the key to reform is the political economy of 
obstacles to reform—identifying the rents and who earns them, and try-
ing to counteract the resulting lobbies. The chapter argues that we cannot 
rely on the market participants to generate reform unaided. We need a top-
  down solution: for example, Big Bangs (major securities market liberaliza-
tions) have always been imposed against the wishes of market participants, 
most of whom then beneﬁ  ted, however, from consequent huge increases in 
turnover.
Reforming C&S is a major step in achieving ﬁ  nancial integration. But how 
should we deﬁ  ne and measure ﬁ  nancial integration? My preferred perspec-
tive relies on the law of one price (LOP): assets generating identical cash 
ﬂ  ows should command the same return regardless of the domiciles of issuer 
and asset holder. Thus, cross-  border ﬂ  ows of assets are neither necessary 
nor suﬃcient for integration. The LOP may hold without any ﬂ  ows at all; 
and cross-  border ﬂ  ows may not equalize returns if there are cross-  country 
diﬀerences in institutions’ monopoly power. Nevertheless, we do look at 
quantities as well as prices: levels of cross- border  ﬁ  nancial market activity.
Another deﬁ  nition of ﬁ  nancial market integration comes from the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB). Not surprisingly, it takes a more institutional 
perspective, saying that the market for a given set of ﬁ  nancial instruments 
and/  or services can be regarded as fully integrated if all potential market 
participants with the same relevant characteristics have the following:
1.  Face a single set of rules when they decide to deal with those ﬁ  nancial 
instruments and/  or services.
2.  Have equal access to the aforementioned set of ﬁ  nancial instruments 
and/ or  services.
3.  Are treated equally when they are active in the market.
Alberto’s deﬁ  nition is very diﬀerent from either. He deﬁ  nes a “market” 
by “the arrangements put in place to assure delivery of goods and of pay-
ments to the counterparties in each trade.” This sees the market as posttrad-
ing, not trading itself, and this is his criterion for ﬁ  nancial integration in a 
region—seamless, competitive posttrading. I ﬁ  nd this rather idiosyncratic 
and surely too narrow—even Alberto slips into talking about exchanges, 
about “national ﬁ  nancial markets” in the conventional sense. And some-
times he distinguishes between a market and its “infrastructure” (“plumb-Why the European Securities Market Is Not Fully Integrated    2 8 5
ing”). Moreover, the deﬁ  nition is not quantitative. This is a problem when 
making intertemporal comparisons or trying to assess the eﬀect of monetary 
union.
Taking a broader perspective, we can see that in addition to problems of 
C&S, many other obstacles can hinder ﬁ  nancial integration: capital controls; 
diﬀerent tax codes; accounting and auditing diﬀerences; diﬀerent bank-
ruptcy laws; diﬀerent requirements of diﬀerent regulatory authorities (e.g., 
consumer protection rules) that entail that ﬁ  nancial institutions have to mar-
ket diﬀerent products across countries; weaknesses in judicial enforcement 
of contracts; the market structure of exchanges; and restrictive practices. 
The single market programme (SMP) and Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) have attacked many of these barriers, however, and technological 
advances and market forces have mitigated their eﬀects.
Thus, home bias in equity markets is falling, especially in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). Cross-  border equity holdings have risen even 
more than the global expansion of cross-  border activity. Returning to the 
LOP, we ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant euro area convergence in equity returns and a declin-
ing relative inﬂ  uence of U.S. markets on euro area equity markets. Other 
evidence of equity market integration includes the often-  remarked switch 
from country to sectoral portfolio strategies and the development of pan-
  euro area index benchmarks (Dow Jones Stoxx, etc.).
We also see falling home bias in the bond markets and considerable inte-
gration of the euro area bond markets. Euro area corporate bond market 
integration is clear from the minimal role of country eﬀects in determining 
yield spreads. Moreover, eﬀective bid- ask spreads in the euro area corporate 
bond markets are now actually lower than in the United States (Biais et al. 
2006).
Government bond market integration has been driven by competition 
(governments can no longer rely on a captive domestic investor base, so they 
must eliminate causes of market segmentation). But Treasuries and Debt 
Management Oﬃces try to maintain liquidity in their own securities through 
various restrictive practices, often aided by primary dealers (Dunne et al. 
2006). Perfect substitutability probably requires “joint and several liabil-
ity”, and that will not come for many years. Common issuance, however, is 
not infeasible, and the primary dealers have worked out detailed proposals. 
But there is strong resistance to common issuance, coming in part from the 
European Central Bank, for reasons that are not entirely clear. Still, there 
is a lot of substitutability arising from having only a single futures contract at 
each maturity—that is, a single benchmark (the Bund contract is used for 
hedging at the ten-  year horizon).
Regression results from gravity models, in the spirit of Portes and Rey 
(2005), ﬁ  nd that cross-  border bond investment is 197 percent larger among 
euro area member countries than between other country pairs. Cross- border 
bond holdings increased 90 percent among euro countries from 1997 to 286    Alberto  Giovannini
2004, over and above what a range of other variables can explain (Lane 
2005). Common membership of the euro area raises bilateral portfolio 
equity holdings by 45 percent according to Coeurdacier and Martin (2007), 
and by 62 percent according to Lane and Milesi- Ferretti (2005). And as fur-
ther evidence of ﬁ  nancial market integration, the Feldstein-  Horioka eﬀect 
has vanished within the European Union (Jappelli and Pagano 2008).
The conclusion I draw from this is that although reform of C&S is slow, 
the obstacles to eﬃcient C&S have not impeded signiﬁ  cant progress in cross-
 border  ﬁ  nancial integration in the European Union. Much as I sympathise 
with Alberto Giovannini’s frustration, much as I would like to see the vested 
interests overcome and the rents disappear, I am pleased to see that markets 
and regulators are having considerable eﬀects nevertheless.
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